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  As an historian economic recent economic thought I find classifications useful for 
students who need a quick entrée into a debate, or for nonspecialists who wants a quick 
and dirty summary of arguments. Used for that purpose, classifications—
Classical/Neoclassical, Keynesian/Monetarist, heterodox/orthodox--can serve a purpose. 
However, when discussing issues among economists involved in a debate, those same 
classifications often serve a negative purpose; they tend to fix positions more firmly than 
they actually are, and loose dimensions and nuances of debates that don’t fit the 
particular classification system used.  
  Consistent with that view about the usefulness of classifications, in my history of 
thought text (Landreth and Colander 2002) I use the heterodox economics classification, 
even while, in my writing for the profession, I strongly discourage the use of the term 
heterodox. Within the profession, “heterodox” is simply not a useful term for promoting 
conversation and understanding. Economists are bright and diverse and differ on multiple 
dimensions. Anyone involved in a debate with economists knows that. Classification 
systems, which obscure the multiple dimensions along which differences exist among 
economists, serve little purpose. Just about every interesting economist that I know is in 
some way orthodox, and in some ways heterodox. In my view, when used in a discussion 
within the profession, the term, heterodox, does not enlighten, but instead intensifies 
conflict, often creating an illusion of differences that are much larger than the actual 
differences. That illusion makes serious conversation, which is what I believe advances a 
profession, difficult, if not impossible.  
  A second problem that I have with the term “heterodoxy” is that it derives its 
meaning in relation to “orthodoxy” (by which most heterodox economists mean 
“neoclassical orthodoxy”), which, when I hear it described by heterodox economists, is in 
large part a straw man that is neither descriptive of what modern economists do or 
believe. (Colander, Holt and Rosser, forthcoming) The reality is that mainstream 
economists don’t go around describing themselves as orthodox economists; they almost 
never use the term “neoclassical,” and they are continually discussing issues, and using 
approaches, that do not fit a rigid neoclassical definition. That’s why the term 
“neoclassical” long ago outlived its usefulness as a description of what economists 
currently do, if it ever did. (Colander 2000) I, quite frankly, have little interest in what 
people are in opposition to; my interest is in what insights their way of looking at an issue 
can provide, and if considering their views more carefully might be worth my time. 
The Post Walrasian Classifier 
  I started using the term Post Walrasian with the strengths and weaknesses of 
classifiers in mind. I used it as a descriptor of a vision in macroeconomics that I believed 
has characterized many economists over the years, but which was not being presented in Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
 
2 3/25/2004 
the texts or receiving the attention within the mainstream that I believed it deserved. The 
Post Walrasian descriptor is neither orthodox nor heterodox. A Post Walrasian is simply 
an economist who is approaching the issue of multi-market coordination from a 
perspective that is slightly different from the approach being used by Walrasians, where 
the term Walrasian is interpreted as an approach that considers multi market coordination 
issues from a vantage point of rational agents operating in an information-rich 
environment.  
A Post Walrasian approach asks the same questions as does the Walrasian 
approach, but it considers the questions from a vantage point of reasonable agents 
operating in information-poor environments.
1 Thus it does not jettison general 
equilibrium—or at least a multi market approach; it simply starts with a slightly different 
specification of what the puzzle is. I did not, and do not, see the economists following a 
Walrasian strategy—which most recently are those following a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium approach--as opposed to Post Walrasian macro. They are simply 
working on a different puzzle. My argument against that Walrasian work is not that it’s 
illogical; it is that it is not especially relevant to the real issues that I’d like to understand 
about the macro economy, whereas I think Post Walrasian macro is relevant to those 
issues.  
I decided that the Post Walrasian classifier would be useful because in talking 
with economists, I came to recognize that many economists shared with me a concern 
about the Walrasian research program that emphasized strict rationality and rich 
information environments. After reading in the field and meeting different economists, I 
came to believe that sufficient alternative work was developing with a common vision, to 
warrant the use of a Walrasian/Post Walrasian classification.  
However, it is important to point out that there is no “we” vs. “them” in the Post 
Walrasian classifier. A researcher could be doing both Walrasian and Post Walrasian 
research at the same time. Moreover, the reason Post Walrasian macroeconomics 
developed is not necessarily that the Post Walrasian researchers thought the earlier 
Walrasian work wrong-headed or incorrect. It developed because of advancements in 
analytic and computing techniques that allowed researchers to start considering more 
complicated analytic techniques. Moreover, for many Post Walrasian researchers, it was 
because that Walrasian work had been explored, and implications drawn, that the Post 
Walrasian avenues seemed possible.  
Post Walrasian macro emerged as a coherent research program in the early 2000s 
for three reasons. The first was that the Walrasian research program had structured the 
macroeconomic problem in a way that attempted to model it from first principles. This 
was quite different from the approach used by earlier economists who tended to regard 
such efforts as impossible (which they probably were given the analytic and computing 
techniques of the time). The second was the advancement in analytic technique such as 
evolutionary game theory and non-linear dynamics, which made it possible to formally 
                                                 
1 It was because of the continuity of the questions being asked that I call the new work Post Walrasian. It is 
not opposed to Walrasian work; it builds on it. Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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analyze more complicated interrelationships. The third reason was advancements in 
computing power, which made analysis less dependent on analytic techniques and more 
dependent on simulation. These developments, combined with developments in statistical 
analysis, improved our ability to relate models to empirical evidence. Combined, these 
opened up research avenues that had not been available to earlier economists, and led to 
the emergence of the Post Walrasian approach to macroeconomics. 
As I discussed above, a classification is most appropriately seen as a crutch for 
students and non-specialists who are not carefully following work on the forefront of 
macroeconomic theory. The Post Walrasian classifier serves little purpose for those 
working inside the field of theoretical macro; they know what’s going on, and as I argued 
above, any classification system tends to obscure issues and suggest stronger differences 
than actually exist for the people being classified. On the research forefront Walrasian 
and Post Walrasian approaches blend together and are hardly distinguishable. But the 
subtlety of that blend is far beyond what can be conveyed to nonspecialists, which is why 
I find the classification system useful. But, like previous classifications, it, too, will likely 
be superceded as macroeconomics evolves.  
Heterodox Criticisms of Purposeful Behavior and Equilibrium 
  Heterodox critics, such as Dutt, (this volume) have taken my exposition of Post 
Walrasian macroeconomics to task on a number of points. One criticism they make is that 
Post Walrasian economics is simply more of the same neoclassical (interpret bad) work, 
since it accepts that individuals optimize. I find this criticism quite unconvincing, since I 
don’t think that the term “neoclassical” describes the economics done today. But if the 
critics mean that any type of purposeful behavior is optimizing, and therefore 
objectionable, then Post Walrasian economics is definitely objectionable since it does 
assume some type of purposeful behavior. What type of purposeful behavior to assume is 
a question in the Post Walrasian research agenda. 
As I see it now, in the Post Walrasian approach the type of purposeful behavior 
that is assumed in a model depends on the structure of the model one is thinking of. From 
an evolutionary game theoretic perspective, such as in the work of Kenneth Binmore 
(1994) or Peyton Young, (1998) one might assume strict rationality of agents in order to 
get some sense of the development of norms, mores and institutions that develop which 
limit behavior in shorter runs. Alternatively one can have a “dial of rationality” such as 
they have in the work at CeNDEF (http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef) in which one tries 
various degrees of rationality to check the robustness of the model. Theoretical work is 
calibrated to reproduce many features of real world data, but is based on heterogeneous 
agents with differing degrees of rationality, rather than on homogeneous agents. Their 
choice of assumptions is governed by experimental and econometric work using field 
data, not on a priori assumptions.  
Abstract models, such as Young’s and Binmore’s are asking a quite different set 
of questions than are applied policy macro models such as van Ess and I (Colander and 
van Ess, 1996) discuss. In these models, a much looser sense of rationality is appropriate, 
and the bounded rationality that is assumed needs to be justified by a combination of Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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introspection, empirical evidence, and behavioral economics work. My point is, that 
depending on the purpose of the model, and the behavior one is trying to model, the 
degree of rationality, and the social limitations on actions one assumes, will necessarily 
be quite different. But behind all the models is an assumption of purposeful behavior.  
For tractability reasons, one may specify an optimizing strategy but the nature of 
the optimization is continually related to individual’s behavior—bringing the model to 
the evidence. In an information poor environment the decisions agents face are strategic 
and far too complicated to have unique solutions. In such environments abstract models 
don’t provide descriptions of reality without enormous institutional detail that serve as 
equilibrium selection mechanisms. Eventually, one may not have to assume any 
rationality since in agent-based models, such as described by Leigh Tesfatsion (2002), the 
various strategies compete and the sustainable strategies emerge rather than being 
assumed.  
If the use of such purposeful behavior assumptions is what heterodox critics are 
faulting me for, I plead very guilty, since I can hardly think that assuming some type of 
purposeful behavior on the part of agents in a model is objectionable. Since I can’t think 
of how to design a model without some type of broad purposeful behavior, there may be 
a deep bias hidden in my approach—a bias that someone who does not share that bias 
will find objectionable. Within economics such people would definitely be heterodox. 
I plead equally guilty to assuming some type of equilibrium. But in my view, 
equilibrium is not a characteristic of the world; it is a characteristic of a model; it is an 
analytic technique, not a statement about what one believes about reality. The nature of 
equilibrium one assumes, and even whether one is interested in equilibrium, depends on 
the model and questions being asked. For example, in evolutionary game theory, 
equilibrium is not an issue; one is searching for a sustainable strategy. Similarly, in a 
“multiple model” model (Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) one is searching for basins of 
attractions in order to understand how slight changes in assumptions might change the 
nature of the system. Agent based modeling is similarly not directly focused on 
equilibrium, but on sustainability. If, however, sustainability in this sense is seen by 
critics as a type of equilibrium that they oppose, then Post Walrasian economics will be 
objectionable to them.  
The Tendency for Efficiency 
  A second objection of Dutt, and other heterodox critics, to the Post Walrasian 
approach is that it is ideologically tainted. As I understand it they are arguing that Post 
Walrasian economics is tainted because it makes the assumption that there is an inherent 
tendency for a system in which agents behave purposefully to operate better than a 
system in which agents do not so operate. I do believe that there is such a tendency in 
purposeful behavior models, so I plead guilty here. What else do we mean by purposeful 
behavior? However, I do not see that view about purposeful behavior and systems as an 
ideological bias about policy since I draw no policy conclusion about the need, or lack of 
need, for government intervention from that belief.  Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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Here’s my reasoning about the relationship of purposeful behavior agent models 
to policy. Purposeful agents try to make things better for themselves; often, (but not 
always) in doing so, they will make things better for more than just themselves. (Trade 
will often be Pareto improving in information-poor, as well as information-rich 
environments.) Where it does not do so, other purposeful agents will work to place 
restrictions on those actions that hurt others. If there is a consistency in the effects of 
certain actions over time, social mores, laws, and other social restrictions will develop 
that limit those actions, producing a better society. Purposeful agents trade on as many 
dimensions as they can; they develop institutions such as government, firms, and NGOs 
to allow them to do more complicated trades. In this sense everything that they do, 
including creating government and regulations to limit individual actions, is an 
expression of that tendency. All individual actions are assumed, in some sense, efficient 
on a local level, but can be enormously inefficient on a higher level. But if it is globally 
inefficient, agents will recognize it and will work to modify it through whatever means 
are available to them.  
In an information-rich model without transactions costs, the connection between 
individual actions and higher-level efficiency is tight; in an information-poor 
environment with transactions costs, the connections is very loose, if it exists at all. In an 
evolutionary sense things that work will be saved and codified by purposeful agents; 
things that don’t will be dumped. So over long periods of time, assuming underlying 
generating functions don’t change, things will likely get better because agents are 
purposeful. Thus, if you had two systems, one with purposeful agents, and the other with 
random agents, the purposeful agent system will be a “preferable” system to agents who 
are allowed to choose among them.  
The above argument may be wrong, but it is a working hypothesis that I have, and 
some day I hope that it will be tested with some agent-based models. I, however, see it as 
a reasonable working hypothesis, not as a reflection of an ideological bias. All it says is 
that the system reflects the efforts of the agents in the system on all levels—both in trying 
to change the system and in operating within the system. It tells me nothing about 
whether the system is optimal or whether I should support or oppose government 
intervention. It is simply a framework though which I view systems such as the economy. 
Elsewhere (Colander 1991) I have discussed my view as one in which the 
economists are internal, not external to the system. A reasonable requirement for any 
model is that it be consistent with the rationality and information set available to 
economists and to agents in the model. In the Walrasian model, economists were 
assumed to understand the model, so it was only reasonable to assume that agents did too. 
In the Post Walrasian approach, agents don’t know what the correct model is, so 
economists must not either. It is in that sense that policy becomes “muddling through” 
rather than control. (Brock and Colander, forthcoming a, b; Colander, 2004) In muddling 
through economic theory tells us nothing about whether the government should or should 
not intervene. That is something that economists study, and the fact that societies support 
a group of agents called economists suggests that society believes the economic system 
can be made better. So for me, the existence of economists in our economy precludes the Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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assumption that agents in the system believe that an economy with no intervention, on 
even an economy in its current state, is efficient. If it were, economists would have never 
developed as a profession. Neither does it say that government intervention is 
theoretically desirable or undesirable. It is simply a framework that develops when one 
thinks of agents as purposeful.  
Macroeconomics as a Science 
  The Post Walrasian research program is unlike most previous research programs 
in macro in that it is neutral about policy. Most previous groups of macro researchers—
Classical, Keynesian, Monetarist, New Classical, Austrian, Radical, Post Keynesian, 
Institutionalist— could be associated with some type of policy recommendation. Thus, 
much of the heterodox macro theory that I read connects theory to policy, and seems to 
support a specific policy approach based on theory. I have the same problem with that 
work that I have with any other economist who pulls policy out of an abstract theory. It is 
just unconvincing to me because the theory inevitably seems to arrive at the policy they 
support, with left wing heterodox economists coming up with theories that call for 
government intervention, and right wing heterodox economists coming up with theories 
that oppose government intervention. The problem is the same one that I have with much 
of the “scientific empirical support” for positions that I read. It seems that that empirical 
support follows policy proclivities of the researcher far more than would be the case were 
the study truly scientific. I’m much more likely to take a look at evidence that goes 
against what the researcher believes, and policy results of a model that go against what 
the researcher’s policy proclivities are. 
  Post Walrasian work cannot be associated with any particular policies. The reason 
is that, with the development of new analytic and computing techniques, 
macroeconomics is emerging as a formal science, not as the engineering approach that 
previously characterized pre New Classical Walrasian macroeconomic modeling, in 
which all models were seen as guides to policy. In that work macroeconomics could not 
exist as a science because the subject matter was beyond formal analysis. It is only with 
the development of new techniques and new much more powerful analytic methods that 
we can start thinking of macro as a science. However, it is not a traditional science, but 
belongs more appropriately as “new kind of science” such as that described by Stephen 
Wolfram (Wolfram 2002).  
  This view of macroeconomics as a science goes against the grain of many 
previous macroeconomists whatever their classification. Because macroeconomics was 
so closely tied to policy, there was always an “us versus them” mentality. The new Post 
Walrasian approach is eliminating that on the theoretical front. There will, of course, still 
be a branch of macroeconomics that is directly concerned with policy, but that will be 
more engineering than science. It will be messy, dirty and involved with value 
judgments; it will be muddling through, and will be conducted, not on the basis of 
economic theory, but on the basis of applied work. In Post Walrasian macroeconomics 
policy and theory are quite separate. In theory the discussion is “what’s going on here? 
Can I understand it?” Can I provide a satisfactory explanation for it?” It’s about fitting 
the theory to the empirical evidence. In policy, the discussion is quite separate from Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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theory, because formal theory does not provide answers for policy. At best it is 
suggestive.  
This policy/theory divide, which classifies policy as muddling through and 
unrelated to formal theory, has a long history in economics; it was nicely articulated in 
J.N. Keynes’s book on Scope and Method of Political Economy. (1891) In that book 
Keynes separated out a policy branch of economics—which he called the art of 
economics—that was quite separate from either positive or normative economics. He 
argued that policy issues involve politics, institutions, and issues that are outside the 
realm of science. While economists, as private individuals, can take positions on such 
questions, they should not use their position as economic scientists to suggest that they 
have some special insight into policy issues.
2  
Keynes’s methodological dictums make good sense, but they have been 
systematically violated in macroeconomics. And, because mainstream macroeconomists 
have claimed the legitimacy of science as supporting some position, it is only natural that 
heterodox economists did also. The return of the science to macroeconomics, which is 
what I think is happening with Post Walrasian macro, will eliminate the need to 
distinguish economists as heterodox or orthodox on the basis of their policy views. 
Theory will be subjected to what Gibson calls the duck test (if it walks and talks like a 
duck, it is a duck) which is essentially the empirical test by which all science is judged.  
What Should Heterodox Economists Do? 
  I raise the above issues because they may help to explain my lack of 
comprehension of comments by Dutt that I appear “to recommend that heterodox 
economists jump on the Post Walrasian bandwagon and join its challenge of orthodox 
Walrasian theory and its free-market policy implications” and that I want heterodox 
economists to “jettison their own approaches.” That is certainly not what I am 
recommending.  
First, I do not see Post Walrasian as challenging an orthodox Walrasian theory, 
because I don’t see any “orthodox” Walrasian theory to challenge. All I am saying to 
Walrasians is: “Hey, with the recent developments in analytics and computational 
technology, maybe we can broaden the assumptions a bit and approach macro issues in a 
slightly different way, with less emphasis on strict rationality and rich information 
environments and more emphasis on a subtler type of rationality and information poor 
environments.”  
Second, I don’t see any policy flowing from either Walrasian or Post Walrasian 
theory. Walrasian economics doesn’t support free markets (even if I knew what free 
markets were) and Post Walrasian economics doesn’t support policy intervention. They 
                                                 
2 Marshall and Pigou backed off from that distinction, creating an approach that Pigou called realistic 
theory. Robbins attacked their approach, arguing essentially that realistic theory should be considered part 
of the art of economics. These issues are discussed in Colander. (2004)  Thinking Outside the Heterodox Box 
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are neutral on both. Policy is much more complicated and nuanced to pull any policy 
issues out of abstract models.  
  Third, I am not calling on anyone to jettison anything, but simply to do it better. 
My view is “whatever works”, where by “works”, I mean “adds insight on how the macro 
economy operates.” I see a gigantic puzzle out there, and I believe that to put it together 
will take many diverse types of work and techniques. I think it is best to think of the Post 
Walrasian approach as a description of the vision underlying the researcher’s work, since 
the work may be involved with only one small piece of the puzzle. I do not see Post 
Walrasian macro tied to any particular technique. 
What I am arguing in regard to heterodox economics is that it is time to jettison 
the “us/them” mentality, and to get on with developing an understanding of the economy 
that fits the empirical evidence, and by fit I mean fitting one’s “aha” sense, a sense that 
one gets when an argument resonates with one’s vision of the world, which for a scientist 
is closely tied with the most sophisticated statistical tests available.
3  
I continue a dialogue with economists once know as heterodox because many of 
their arguments fit my "aha" sense. That’s true of heterodox economists on both the right 
and the left. I strongly hope that that work continues and gets a better hearing than it has 
to date. My call to abandon heterodoxy is not a call to stop the work heterodox 
economists are doing, but simply a call for heterodox economists to stop seeing their 
work as something that a good mainstream economist would not find interesting because 
of the mainstream’s ideological blinders. That isn’t the reason heterodox work isn’t being 
considered. Heterodox work isn’t considered because heterodox arguments have not 
struck a chord with mainstream economist’s “aha” sense of the world. The good 
mainstream challenges the mainstream all the time, and the mainstream will be much 
stronger if the strong critics of whatever is currently believed converse within the 
mainstream, rather than develop a separate conversation outside the mainstream.  
Conclusion 
  In my view a good economist is a good economist; he or she is neither heterodox 
nor orthodox. He or she is always questioning, willing to consider new approaches, and 
trying to see whether he or she can gain a little more insight into what is going on by 
using this method, or that method, or structuring the organization of the facts in a slightly 
different manner. Sometimes the answer is “I don’t see how I can do that.” So one stays 
with the existing approach that one was taught. Other times the answer is: “Here’s a new 
way that seems promising? Let’s try it.” Ultimately, the test of the approach is whether it 
adds a bit more “aha” to ones understanding. When it does, it is an approach with 
“Oomph,” as Deirdre McCloskey would call it, and ultimately it is Oomph that an 
economic researcher is looking for.  
                                                 
3 I discuss the “aha” sense, which I call the “yeah criterion” in Colander (2000). Bob Gibson’s discussion 
of this issue (Gibson, this volume) said many of these issues better than I could have, and thus I will not 
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